Unmasking the Elephant
Disentangling Methodological and Philosophical Naturalism
Introduction
In contemporary discourse, two terms—Methodological Naturalism (MN) and Philosophical Naturalism (PN)—are often used loosely and sometimes interchangeably, despite each representing a completely distinct concept. Understanding the distinction between the two is crucial for achieving clarity in discussions within the domains of science, philosophy, and theology. This article delves into their differences, exploring the historical shift from MN to PN, and examining the implications of conflating these concepts. Let us begin by defining both terms.
Methodological Naturalism
Methodological Naturalism (MN) is the scientific approach that limits its investigations to natural causes and processes alone. MN asserts that all phenomena can be explained through observable, testable, and repeatable mechanisms in the natural world; it discourages resorting to supernatural explanations when studying nature. Advocates of MN do not claim that the supernatural does not exist; rather, they consider it a practical framework for focusing scientific inquiry on what can be empirically studied.
Philosophical Naturalism
Philosophical Naturalism (also known as ontological or metaphysical naturalism), on the other hand, states that everything that exists can be explained entirely by natural causes, laws, and processes. Philosophical Naturalism, venturing into the metaphysical, rejects the idea of the supernatural or anything beyond the physical universe, claiming that nature is all there is and scientific inquiry is the only reliable means of understanding it.
Key Differences
The difference can be summarized as follows:
Methodological Naturalism:
What It Is: A practical strategy used in scientific inquiry.
Purpose: To limit research to natural causes and processes.
Scope: It’s a methodological tool focusing on what can be empirically studied.
Implication: It does not make any claims about the existence or non-existence of the supernatural; it confines itself to what is accessible to scientific methods.
Philosophical Naturalism:
What It Is: An ontological worldview asserting that the natural world is all that exists.
Purpose: To provide a comprehensive explanation of reality by attributing every phenomenon to natural causes and processes.
Scope: It covers the entirety of existence—from physical phenomena to consciousness, ethics, and beyond—insisting that all aspects of reality must be understood in natural, materialistic terms.
Implication: It rejects any appeal to the supernatural in all domains, influencing not only scientific inquiry but also areas like philosophy and ethics.
The Major Shift
Certain historical developments contributed to reshaping our understanding of these terms, thereby blurring the lines between them.
The shift from MN to PN can be largely attributed to at least two factors. One key factor was the Enlightenment in Europe (late 17th century onwards), which emphasised reliance on human reason, primarily within the scientific domain. Over time, this approach extended beyond science, leading to a broader rejection of religion in all aspects of life—not just within the physical domain.
Another factor was that philosophical thinkers and naturalists began to view physical science not merely as a tool for understanding nature but also as a means for defining reality and the nature of existence itself.
The Elephant in the Room
Despite the clear distinction between MN and PN, the two are often, intentionally or inadvertently, conflated. This blending of methodological practices with metaphysical assertions is the elephant in the room, a glaring oversight that leads to significant misunderstandings. When MN is mistaken for PN, we risk extending empirical findings into realms where they do not belong, effectively transforming a practical scientific tool into a broad philosophical claim.
The problem arises when scientific inquiry, under the guise of MN, is manipulated to support conclusions that extend into PN. So, for instance, the same investigative process is commended when it attempts to indicate the absence of the metaphysical, yet condemned as "pseudoscience" when it challenges that paradigm by suggesting the possibility of a transcendent cause.
If one scientist is not allowed to infer Divine intervention from empirical investigation, then another should not be permitted to make sweeping metaphysical claims from the same foundations.
Exclusion without Justification
Operating within the MN framework, concepts such as Intelligent Design—and anything beyond the material, including 'God'—have been excluded from the domain of science and consequently dismissed by scientific and academic institutions. Nonetheless, when Intelligent Design or any metaphysical idea is suggested, critics are quick to object: "Where are the peer-reviewed scientific papers supporting this?" Such responses overlook a significant paradox: if the prevailing scientific paradigm precludes non-natural explanations from the outset, how can such perspectives ever gain acceptance in peer-reviewed literature?
To get a clearer understanding of the MN approach, consider the example of a principal addressing teachers in a meeting, instructing them to assume, purely as a strategy for increasing effort, that the pupils’ parents do not exist. This directive is obviously not meant to deny the actual existence of parents but rather to ensure that teachers take full responsibility for their students' education without deferring to external influences.
Similarly, MN functions as a practical guideline in science, requiring researchers to limit their explanations to natural causes without resorting to the supernatural. However, just as it would be absurd to infer from the principal’s instruction that parents do not exist, it is equally wrong to conclude, based solely on scientific experimentation, that nothing beyond the natural world exists.
This distinction, however, is frequently overlooked. In many academic and popular discussions, MN is subtly reinterpreted as PN, effectively pushing a metaphysical claim under the guise of scientific inquiry.
A Case of Misplaced Conclusions
To illustrate this further, imagine a college lecturer appointed to teach a car mechanics course. Throughout the duration of the course, the lecturer covers various aspects of a car’s mechanisms within the allocated time. However, because he makes no mention of the designer and inventor of the car (due to not being part of the course), some students mistakenly conclude that this omission necessarily proves no such originator ever existed. In this example, the tutor operates within the framework of MN, whereas the students who reach such a conclusion have ventured beyond MN and, so to speak, entered the realm of the philosophical.
A similar misunderstanding can be observed in a different scenario. Suppose a group of students, all recipients of stipends from their college, regularly gather for meals, each time one of them covering the cost of the meal. However, whenever someone asks, "Who paid for today’s meal?", there is a particular student among the group who, instead of naming the person who paid the bill, invariably responds, "It’s the college who’s actually paid for the meal"—referring to the stipends given for the term.
As is evidently clear, while this individual’s statement is technically true in a broader sense, it ignores the immediate and direct cause, shifting focus away from the conversation at hand and detracting from the justice of the immediate context.
Contradiction Par Excellence
This was the purpose of MN and why it was considered an integral part of science by earlier scientists, most of whom were theists. The explanation and examples above demonstrate why, despite their strong theistic backgrounds and beliefs, Muslims and Christians—who were at the forefront of science in different eras—had no issues with scientific inquiry or its conclusions.
However, something quite disconcerting has been occurring recently within the scientific domain: any concept of the metaphysical, such as the mention of God, is strictly required to be excluded from all equations. For purely academic reasons, this is understandable, as the empirical relies solely on the physical and observable. Yet, to then allow researchers to pass judgments on the metaphysical purely based on the underpinnings of the physical defies both logic and justice.
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